

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1990

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INFO USMISSION NATO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0069

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; FEBRUARY 24 WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 127TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, HELD ON FEBRUARY 24, AND CHAIRED BY GDR REP (OESER), FRG REP (BEHREND) DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IN IT, BEHREND STRESSED THAT AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS MUST TAKE THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR FULLY INTO ACCOUNT. THE MAIN POINTS OF THE FRG STATEMENT, THE FULL TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY AIRGRAM, WERE:

1. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS, THE EAST MUST REVISE ITS APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS, WHICH WOULD CONTRACT-
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UALIZE EASTERN SUPERIORITIES IN MANPOWER AND MOST MAJOR WEAPONS.

2. THE OUTCOME ENVISAGED BY THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD BE INEQUITABLE AND WOULD RUN COUNTER TO THE AGREED AIMS OF STRENGTHENING SECURITY AND ENHANCING STABILITY IN EUROPE.

3. DESPITE EASTERN ATTEMPTS TO IGNORE IT, THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IS RELEVANT TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS AND MUST BE CONSIDERED IN EVALUATING ANY APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.

4. UNLESS THE UNALTERABLE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN AN AGREEMENT, WESTERN SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED SINCE AN AGREEMENT WOULD ELIMINATE THE EXISTING FREEDOM OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY MANPOWER TO COMPENSATE FOR THE UNFAVORABLE IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHY.

5. THE MOST SALIENT GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION'S LOCATION ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTIONS AREA WOULD ENABLE IT TO RAPIDLY AND EFFECTIVELY ADD TO ITS FORCES IN THE AREA, SHOULD THE NEED ARISE, WHILE GEOGRAPHY WOULD PLACE THE UNITED STATES AT A SUBSTANTIAL DISADVANTAGE IN ENGAGING IN A SIMILAR UNDERTAKING.

6. MOREOVER, AN AGREEMENT WOULD IMPOSE CO RESTRICTIONS ON THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF SOVIET FORCES WITHIN ITS OWN TERRITORY, IN CONTRAST TO THE LIMITATIONS WHICH WOULD BE PLACED ON THE FORCES OF THOSE PARTICIPATING STATES WHOSE TERRITORY LIES WHOLLY WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

7. BOTH SIDES EVALUATE THE IMPLICATIONS OF ANY AGREEMENT BY ESTIMATING ITS POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON A SITUATION OF CONFLICT; GEOGRAPHY IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN ANY SUCH CONFIDENTIAL

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EVALUATION.

8. EASTERN CONTENTIONS THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR WAS DEALT WITH IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS OR THAT IT IS IRRELEVANT BECAUSE ANY CONFLICT WOULD INEVITABLY SPREAD BEYOND THE REDUCTIONS AREA CANNOT BE SUSTAINED.

9. THE MECHANISTIC EASTERN APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS IGNORES THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY, BUT RATHER TREATS THE REDUCTION AREA AS IF IT WERE A SELF-CONTAINED ENTITY AND FAILS TO ALLOW FOR THE DIFFERENCE IN THE IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE AREA AND THOSE OUTSIDE IT.

10. NEITHER WESTERN FORCES STATIONED CLOSE TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS NOR US AIRLIFT CAPACITY COMPENSATE FOR THE NEIGHBORING SOVIET UNION'S ABILITY TO RAPIDLY DEPLOY MUCH LARGER FORCES INTO THE AREA OVERLAND AND VIA THE SOVIET UNION'S OWN AIRLIFT CAPABILITY.

11. EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT OTHER FACTORS SUCH
AS POPULATION, MILITARY-ECONOMIC POTENTIAL AND LOGISTICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE MUST BE CONSIDERED IF GEOGRAPHY IS TO BE
TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT OVERLOOK THE FACT THAT, IN THESE OTHER
INSTANCES AS WELL, THE PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION
TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS GIVES THE ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST.

12. EASTERN CONTENTIONS THAT THE NUMBER OF TRAINED
RESERVISTS MUST SIMILARLY BE CONSIDERED IGNORE THE FACT
THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD PLACE LIMITATIONS ON THE
ACTIVITIES OF RESERVISTS OF COUNTRIES IN THE
AREA, WHILE LEAVING THE ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET RESERVISTS
IN THE NEIGHBORING USSR UNCONSTRAINED.

13. EASTERN ARGUMENTS THAT THE EVOLUTION OF THE FORCE
STRUCTURE ON EACH SIDE OVER THE YEARS HAS TAKEN
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GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS INTO ACCOUNT NEGLECT THE FUNDAMENTAL
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SITUATION BEFORE AND THE SITUATION
AFTER AN AGREEMENT.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

14. THE ORIGINAL WESTERN PROPOSALS, UNLIKE THOSE OF THE EAST, WERE INTRINSICALLY EQUITABLE AND TOOK GEOGRAPHY INTO ACCOUNT.

15. IN DECEMBER 1975, IN ORDER TO MEET SPECIFIC EASTERN CONCERNS AND TO BRING ABOUT AN AGREEMENT, THE WEST ADDED SUBSTANTIALLY TO ITS PROPOSED REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS WITHOUT ASKING ANY ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS OF THE EAST.

16. THE SUBSTANCE OF EASTERN PROPOSALS, BY CONTRAST, HAS REMAINED UNCHANGED FROM THE OUTSET AND STILL SEEKS TO CONTRACTUALIZE EXISTING DISPARITIES FAVORING THE EAST.

17. THE WEST BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR
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PROGRESS IN THIS ROUND, BUT THAT IT IS UP TO THE EAST TO MAKE USE OF THESE POSSIBILITIES BY PROVIDING AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE WEST'S DECEMBER 1975 PROPOSALS. RESOR

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